In the year 2000, the global economy was dominated by 6 groupings of countries:
the United States, the European Union (which then consisted of 15 countries [EU15]), India, China, Japan, and a group of six Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan [SE6] ). As measured by gross domestic product (GDP), these six groupings accounted for 73 percent of the world's economic output and 58 percent of the global population (see Table 1 ). The balance of the world (including Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe) accounted for about 28 percent of GDP and 42 percent of the global population.
Although political influence is more difficult to define, the United States, with its advanced military technology and its ability to project its military might anywhere, obviously ranks first. However, the EU15 also has great wealth and advanced military technology. The number of active troops in the armies of the EU15 nations was collectively slightly higher than that of the U.S., and although their annual defense budgets were only a third of that of the U.S., they had nearly as many fighter aircraft and more tanks than the U.S. Perhaps the biggest gap was in hard assets: the EU15 is far behind the U.S. in aircraft carriers, missile cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Table 2 presents the forecasts for 2040. The population forecasts are those of the United Nations. The economic forecasts are mine but were influenced by the forecasts of the C.I.A. and The Economist. To my mind, the most unsettling of the forecasts in Table   2 is the relative decline the European Union implied by its stagnation in population and its modest growth in GDP.
Although the EU population in 2000 exceeded that of the U.S. by about a third, by 2040 the EU population will be somewhat smaller than that of the U.S. The projected stagnation of the EU15 population is based primarily on the persistence of extremely low Table 1 The Global Distribution of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) countries, and has been below reproduction for several decades.
One implication of the low fertility rate is that the population of the EU15 is aging rapidly. In the year 2000, the median age in Italy and Germany, for example, was about 40, which is a decade higher than in China and half a decade higher than in the U.S. By 2040, the median age in Italy and Germany is predicted to be about 50. This rapid aging of many EU15 countries means that their dependency ratios (the ratio of economically inactive to economically active persons) will soar. These demographic factors will, by themselves, significantly curtail the capacity for economic growth. However, political and cultural factors appear to be reinforcing the impediments to economic growth. These include limitations on the length of the work week and increasingly heavy taxes on businesses to support large social welfare programs (that are nevertheless facing bankruptcy) and are threatening to make EU15 firms uncompetitive in the global market.
I do not mean to imply that labor productivity and per capita income in the EU15
will not grow. They will grow at a rate that, by past standards, was not bad (about 1.8 percent per annum), but they will not be able to match the surge in growth that will prevail in South and East Asia (see Table 3 ). The European market will be about 60 percent larger in 2040 than it was in 2000. But the U.S.'s market will be over 300 percent larger, India's will be over 1,400 percent larger, and China's will be 2,400 percent larger. Indeed, the Chinese market in 2040 by itself will probably be larger than the combined markets of the U.S., the EU15, India, and Japan. It may well be the case that English will survive as the principal commercial language until 2040, but I suspect that there will be an explosion of business managers in the West who speak Mandarin. 
Explaining the Forecast for China
To many, the most provocative aspect of Table 2 is the forecast that, in 2040, the Chinese economy will reach $123 trillion, or nearly 3 times the output of the entire globe in the year 2000. Moreover, the per capita income of China will reach $85,000 more than twice the forecast for the European Union (EU15) and also much higher than India and Japan. In other words, China is forecasted to go from a poor country in 2000 to a superrich country in 2040, although it will not have overtaken the U.S. The basis for so optimistic a view of the course of the Chinese economy needs to be elucidated, with attention paid to both economic and political issues.
Potential Economic Constraints
When analyzing the constraints on Chinese economic growth, it is useful to divide the economy into three sectors: agriculture, services, and industry. Over the quarter century between 1978 and 2003, the growth of labor productivity has been high in each of these sectors, averaging about 6 percent per annum. At the national level, output per worker grew by 9 percent. That is because the level of output per worker was much higher in industry and services than in agriculture. Hence, by shifting workers from agriculture-where the bulk of labor has been concentrated-to industry or services, the economy obtained an additional boost. This inter-industry shift added 3 percentage points to the annual national growth rate. I expect inter-industry shifts to continue to be an important element in China's economic growth over the next generation.
In addition, a more important factor in sustaining China's high growth rate will be the enhancement of the quality of the labor by education. China has invested heavily in rapidly expanding enrollment ratios in both secondary and tertiary education. As I have reported elsewhere (Fogel 2005) , U.S. data indicate that college-educated workers are 3 times as productive, and a high school graduate is 1.8 times as productive as a worker with less than a ninth grade education. Thus, increasing the enrollment ratio in high school to 100 percent and in college to 50 percent over the next generation, would by itself add over 6 percentage points to the annual growth rate.
These 
Will Political Instability Undermine Economic Growth?
So far I have focused purely on economic issues. Some analysts argue that political instability is a serious impediment to China's ability to maintain high rates of economic growth. Several scenarios have been outlined in which political factors could thwart economic goals. Some of these scenarios begin with an economic breakdown brought on by a sharp cyclical downturn that would raise unemployment and undermine a precarious social stability. Others warn that a growing social unrest has been brought on by the financial problems and inefficiencies of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
These problems have not only led to rising urban unemployment but have also resulted in the failure to pay promised wages, pensions, health-care allowances, and housing allowances (Bremmer 2005; Chaohua 2005 Moreover, many of the problems singled out are of long standing, such as the inefficiency of many SOEs. While these SOEs may be a drag on the economy, China has nevertheless been able to grow at over 8 percent per capita for more than a quarter of a century. The idea that these inefficient firms will suddenly go bankrupt is far-fetched. The policy of China's State Council has been to gradually phase them out or to reorganize them on a profitable basis so as not to sharply increase unemployment. Not only does the government have the finances needed to continue subsidizing inefficient firms if it chooses to do so for economic or political reasons, but the burden of these subsidies will also gradually diminish because the share of the industrial output supplied by these underperforming SOEs will gradually decline and the burden of a given level of subsidies will rapidly diminish with the economy growing so rapidly. 2
Although there are disagreements about economic policy among the top leaders, the proposition that China should continue to transform itself into a market economy is not at issue. Nor is there disagreement over the policy of promoting increasing autonomy in economic decisions as a lever of rapid economic growth. As many analysts have pointed out, the government is unified around a policy that has been called "market Some analysts argue that unless China permits competing political parties, powerful pressures will build up between the provinces and the center that will undermine political stability and thwart continued high rates of economic growth.
Others argue that the unsolved inequalities have also built up pressures at the grass roots that threaten to become unmanageable (Goldstone 1995; Ohman 1995; Esarey 2002) .
Other issues stressed by analysts include mounting environmental hazards, lagging development of public health programs, and endemic corruption (Shambaugh 2000; Chapman 2002 ).
The difficulty with these arguments is that they assume that the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the State Council are unaware of these problems.
The leaders are quite well aware that the successes of their growth policies have weakened the central government's control over daily life and access to information.
Indeed, one purpose of the reforms was to promote creativity at the local level by widespread corruption, increasing inequality, persistent unemployment, burdensome taxes, and unpaid pensions. Nevertheless, the polls also reveal majority support for the central government and overwhelming belief that the courts, the press, and government institutions will be responsive to their grievances (Pei 2001; Lin et al. 2002; China Newsweek 2005). 3 Popular confidence in the government reflects the widespread belief among the Chinese that their living conditions have improved (67 percent better, 12 percent worse, 20 percent no change). The level of confidence about whether living conditions will continue to improve is similar. According to another poll, optimism about the future is slightly higher in rural areas (75 percent) than in the cities (68 percent). Hence, it is not surprising that political reform is quite limited, although there is an expectation that the government will gradually improve legal and governmental institutions. 4 This generally favorable view of government not only reflects the pragmatic responses of leaders at all levels of government to grievances, but also the frequent intervention of the central government with local officials when they are too slow to respond to complaints. It also reflects the rapid increases in income experienced by the great majority of households for more than a quarter of a century (Fewsmith 2003) .
This combination of widely shared economic advances and governmental attention to public opinion, especially with respect to grievances, is a formula for continued political stability. One indication of the stability of the regime and the selfconfidence of its leaders is its successful bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. Another is its encouragement of Chinese students to enroll in American and European universities.
The gradual loosening of constraints on expression in China is likely to continue over the next several decades. Whether or not these developments lead to a multiparty system of the American type remains to be seen. However, the government's responsiveness to popular concerns indicates that political stability is likely to remain at the level required for continued long-term economic growth.
Explaining the Forecast for India
In the case of India, it is not only necessary to explain why I am so optimistic about its economic future, but also why I am more optimistic about Chinese economic growth than Indian economic growth. Although India's per capita income has been growing at quite high rates by global standards-about 6 percent per annum (7 percent since 1996), its growth rate has been a third less than the Chinese rate. Constraints on Indian economic growth are still substantial.
Potential Economic Constraints
Although India has an excellent system of higher education, which is capable of The Indian caste system, which divides the population into a hereditary hierarchy that determines economic and social opportunities, has relaxed somewhat as a result of government policies. The government has sought to offset the discrimination against lower castes with educational subsidies. However, the caste system remains rigid in rural areas and is propped up by parties that seek to represent themselves as the champions of the lower castes.
The social, religious, and ethnic clashes, which are sources of instability that threaten to undermine the conditions for economic growth, have so far been contained.
Moreover, the commitment of the leaders of both major parties to ease these divisions suggests that conditions for rapid economic growth will continue during the next generation.
The Future of Liberal Democracy
So far I have dealt with political questions primarily as they bear on the potential for economic growth. However, Tables 1 and 2 indicate that richer countries that were the chief bastions of liberal democracy during the second half of the twentieth centurythe EU15, the U.S., and Japan -will decline in relative importance by 2040. In year 2000, these groups represented 51 percent of global GDP, but by 2040 their combined share is projected to decline to 21 percent. Most worrisome is the projected decline in the EU15 from 21 percent to just 5 percent of the global share of GDP. Given Western Europe's role during the past several centuries as the cradle of liberal democracy, exporting it to the New World, Oceania, and other continents, who will take up the slack during the next generation?
My answer is Asia. Liberal democracy is thriving in India and has become rooted in four of the SE6 (Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Singapore), but is more fragile in Thailand and Malaysia. The U.S. is an influential Pacific power that is helping to promote liberal democracy throughout Asia and Oceania. On this account, nations representing 45 percent of global GDP in 2040 (the U.S., the EU15, India, Japan, and the SE6) will be promoters of liberal democracy, in the six categories singled out by Tables 1   and 2 .
However, Tables 1 and 2 
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China's output of higher education expanded so rapidly that there is now a temporary glut of graduates (Cody 2006; Mooney 2007 ).
